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DIRECT EVIDENCE OR MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: HOW
TODAY’S PATERNITY LEAVE POLICIES ARE PAVING THE
WAY FOR TITLE VII’S NEWEST WAVE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE
JURISPRUDENCE
Annie McClellan*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Gary Ehrhard, an air traffic controller with the Transportation
Department, was denied several days of child care leave that was provided
to mothers.1 When Mr. Ehrhard complained of the treatment, he claimed
that the Transportation Department retaliated against him when it made
him present medical notes when he missed work because of an illness,
among other things.2
In 2008, Ariel Ayanna was terminated from his job as an associate at a
law firm because of his “personal issues.”3 Ayanna had taken time off
under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to care for his suicidal
wife during her second pregnancy.4 Even though he never missed
deadlines and there was no indication that his work suffered, supervisors
withheld work from him and ultimately fired him.5
In 2013, CNN correspondent, Josh Levs, received only two weeks off
of work after his daughter was born five weeks prematurely.6 After
requesting more time off to assist his wife with the newborn and their
other two young children, CNN and Turner Broadcasting refused.7 At the
time, CNN offered ten weeks of paid leave to biological mothers and the
same amount to parents of either sex who adopted children or relied on
surrogates.8 Alternatively, biological fathers only received two weeks of
leave.9
* Associate Member, 2017-2018 University of Cincinnati Law Review. To Judge Joseph P. Kinneary
Professor of Law, Sandra F. Sperino, thank you for your guidance with this submission. To my family,
friends, and editors, thank you for your support.
1. Noam Scheiber, Attitudes Shift on Paid Leave: Dads Sue Too, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept.
15,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/business/attitudes-shift-on-paid-leave-dads-suetoo.html.
2. Id. (a determination of retaliation was not made, because the case was settled).
3. Sheri Qualters, Dechert and Former Associate Settle “Macho Culture” Retaliation Case, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1360503108457/;
Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, 914 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D. Mass. 2012).
4. Scheiber, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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These three fathers were all fortunate enough to settle their
discrimination lawsuits with their respective employers.10 Arguably, men
are dissuaded from bringing discrimination lawsuits because of the
“jurisprudential rhetoric of protecting women” or simply because they
and their employers are unaware of Title VII violations.11 Paternity leave
policies are becoming a prominent issue in today’s employment law
arena, with more employers and employees recognizing these widespread
sex differentials.12
At the United Nation’s commemoration of International Women’s Day
in March 2017, the United Nations Women Goodwill Ambassador
summed up the problem of parental leave discrepancies:
American women are currently entitled to [twelve] weeks[] [of]
unpaid leave. American men are entitled to nothing. That
information landed differently for me when, one week after my
son’s birth I could barely walk, when I was getting to know a human
who was completely dependent on my husband and I for everything,
when I was dependent on my husband for most things, when we
were relearning everything we thought we knew about our family
and relationship. It landed differently.13
Through Title VII sex discrimination claims, there is an opportunity to
“redefine and . . . destigmatize men’s roles as caregivers” to avoid these
issues in the future.14 Successful Title VII discrimination claims
regarding paternity leave will help end the undervaluation of fathers and
overburdening of mothers.15 This Comment is the first article to propose
that a direct evidence analysis, instead of a McDonnell Douglas analysis,
is the best method for arguing such paternity leave discrimination claims
under Title VII.
Below, Section II will articulate the background of paternity leave
policies today and Title VII discrimination claims. Section III will
examine how a direct evidence analysis is superior to a McDonnell
Douglas analysis of paternity leave discrimination claims under Title VII,
10. Id.
11. Christen Linke Young, Childbearing, Childrearing, and Title VII: Parental Leave Policies at
Large American Law Firms, 118 YALE L.J. 1182, 1225-27 (2009).
12. Taft Announces Industry Leading Policy for Attorney Parental Leave, TAFT STETTINIUS &
HOLLISTER (Apr. 4, 2017), http://taftlaw.com/news/story/2338-taft-announces-industry-leading-policyfor-attorney-parental-leave.
13. Speech: “Paid Parental Leave Is About Creating Freedom to Define Roles” – UN Women
WOMEN
(Mar.
8,
2017),
Goodwill
Ambassador
Anne
Hathaway,
UN
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/3/speech-anne-hathaway-iwd-2017.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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as well as look at how many paternity leave policies today show direct
evidence of sex discrimination. Section III will also provide solutions for
employers in drafting future paternity leave policies, and the section will
address the likely effects of new legislation proposals in the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
Paternity leave sex discrimination claims can be interpreted in light of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and through the various lenses
courts place on analyses of discrimination. Part (a) discusses paternity
leave discrimination suits as they stand today. Part (b) tracks the
evolution of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to understand the
backdrop of today’s proposed analyses. Part (c) examines the direct
evidence analysis of Title VII claims, and Part (d) examines the
McDonnell Douglas analysis of Title VII claims.
A. Paternity Leave Today
Women have garnered some success in establishing favorable parental
leave policies.16 The Supreme Court has recognized a need to treat women
differently than men during postpartum medical recovery periods.17
Moreover, in a recent study conducted by the nonprofit PL+US (Paid
Leave for the United States), almost one half of the country’s top sixty
companies provide well over the medically recommended six-week
period of disability recovery for women who give birth.18
Men, alternatively, face a starkly different reality and less success with
leave policies. In the same study, almost one half of the country’s top
sixty companies offered men at most two weeks of paternity leave, with
most of those companies offering zero days of leave.19 Even if granted
paternity leave, men today feel pressure to return to work before the
granted leave time is finished.20 The stereotype that women belong at
home and men belong in the workforce is still prominent in today’s
workforce.21 Working men are overwhelmingly required to exude non16. See discussion infra Part III.b.
17. See California Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, et al. v. Guerra, et al., 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
18. Forging Ahead of Falling Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report
by
PL+US:
Paid
Leave
for
the
United
States,
PL+US
(Nov.
16,
2016),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/plus/pages/48/
attachments/original/1480616519/report.pdf?1480616519.
19. Id.
20. Scheiber, supra note 1.
21. See id. (“‘The woman was more quickly written off; the expectation was that she’ll take a lot
of time off’ . . . . ‘For the man, it’s more like “Oh, here’s a test for him. What’s he going to do?”’”
(referring to when men and women are given the option to take off work after having a child)).
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nurturance, non-dependence, and non-expression, even as 21st century
employees.22 Moreover, Congress itself still explicitly emphasizes these
stereotypes in its findings of the present-day FMLA: “Due to the nature
of the roles of men and women in our society, the primary responsibility
for family caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects
the working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of
men.”23
As a result of these stereotypes, paternity leave policies currently range
from nonexistent to eighteen weeks.24 A study of the top 100 American
law firms found that, on average, women are granted twelve weeks of
maternity leave, and men are granted four weeks of paternity leave.25
Often, employers separate parental leave policies based on “primary” or
“secondary” caregiver status.26 While such policies initially appear
facially gender neutral, employers’ applications of the policies in the
workplace often rely on gender assumptions.27 For example, one policy
distinguishes between primary and non-primary caregivers, offering leave
to “a birthmother who is a primary caregiver” and shorter leave to all
“male attorneys,” with no reference to any possible caregiver status.28
The Association of Legal Administrators 2016 Compensation Survey
indicates that private American law firms typically offer eight weeks of
paid or unpaid parental leave for primary caregivers and four weeks of
paid or unpaid leave to non-primary caregivers.29
Such gender distinctions in policies are magnified by employee
expectations of gender stereotypes.30 A Boston University professor, who
analyzed numerous leave policies around the country, found that when
men leave the office at 4:30 p.m., they are assumedly meeting a client,
but when women leave the office at 5:00 p.m., they are assumedly picking
up children.31 Researchers have shown that when a man is late to work,
colleagues assume he was stuck in traffic or had a client meeting.32
22. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine Face
of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUMBIA J. OF GENDER AND LAW 253, 275 (2013).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5).
24. Scheiber, supra note 1.
25. Young, supra note 11, at 1190.
26. Id. at 1191.
27. Id. at 1192.
28. Id. at 1188 n. 25, 1192 n. 38 (citing National Association of Legal Professions, Directory of
Legal Employers, http://www.nalpdirectory.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2009)) (Noting that to access
workplace questionnaire data, the link must be followed to “Advanced Search,” an employer much be
searched, and the “Workplace Questionnaire” icon must be clicked. Here, workplace questionnaire for
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP was searched.).
29. Taft Announces Industry Leading Policy for Attorney Parental Leave, supra note 12.
30. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 280-81.
31. Scheiber, supra note 1.
32. Young, supra note 11, at 1202.
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However, when women are late to work, colleagues assume they had
childcare issues.33
Fortunately, some big companies, especially big law firms, are
beginning to shift toward equal paternity leave policies.34 Facebook
currently offers four months of paid parental leave for both men and
women.35 The Midwestern law firm Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister, LLC
adopted a four-month parental leave policy for men and women
regardless of their marital status, regardless of sexual orientation, and
regardless of whether the leave was for natural birth or adoption.36
Nonetheless, these companies are the exceptions and not the norm.37 Men
continue to suffer stigmatization for taking paternal leave, and that stigma
is only slowly lifting.38
Same-sex couples especially struggle with discrepancies in parental
leave policies between males and females.39 While no cases have been
litigated regarding same-sex couples and discrimination that they face
under paternal leave policies,40 many individual case studies evidence the
struggle of same-sex couples.41 One woman had to undergo a caesarean
section and use FMLA leave to get a full twelve weeks off of work.42 Her
wife was only given one week of “paternity leave,” as the employer
termed it.43 Another woman’s wife called off work the day after her
partner gave birth and was given no other leave.44 The couple’s baby was
born two months prematurely, and the birth mother had to spend her time
alone in the NICU with the child, after being forced to quit her job, while

33. Young, supra note 11, at 1202 n. 86 (citing Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case;
Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 389 (2004) (“[W]hen a mother is absent or late
for work she is assumed to be caring for her children; a similarly-situated father is assumed to be handling
a work-related issue.”)).
34. Stacy Zaretsky, Paternity Leave Bias in Big Law: When Will It End?, ABOVE THE LAW (May
31, 2017, 12:28 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/05/paternity-leave-bias-in-biglaw-when-will-it-end/.
35. Scheiber, supra note 1.
36. Zaretsky, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Elizabeth Renter, Maternity and Paternity Leave: A Guide for Expectant Parents,
NERDWALLET (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/health/maternity-and-paternity-leavea-guide-for-expectant-parents/.
40. A search for “(“maternity leave” or “paternity leave” or “paternal leave”) and (“same sex”)”
under All State and All Federal in Westlaw produced twenty cases, none of which addressed actual leave
policies explicitly.
41. Susie Armitage & Sarah Karlan, Here’s What Leave Is Like for LGBT Families, BUZZFEED
NEWS (July 13, 2017, 10:48 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/susiearmitage/this-is-what-its-like-to-takeparental-leave-when-youre-lgbt?utm_term=.hyBA4DE96#.lkNobvypG.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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her wife immediately started working again.45
Other couples have recently taken a stand against parental leave
policies that seemingly discriminate between men and women. On June
15, 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), the ACLU of
Ohio, and Outten & Golden, LLP, an employment law firm, filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
regarding J.P. Morgan Chase’s (“Chase”) parental leave policy.46 By
June of 2017, a father who has worked at Chase for seven years had a
two-year-old and a newborn.47 Chase’s current parental leave policy
allows biological mothers sixteen weeks of paid parental leave, under the
assumption that they are the primary caregivers.48
Fathers,
unquestionably classified as secondary caregivers, are allowed only two
weeks of paid parental leave.49 To constitute a primary caregiver, the
father claims that a man must make an active showing that his wife
returned to work or is medically incapable of caring for a child alone.50
He claims that women are never required to make such a showing.51
Adoptive parents receive two to sixteen weeks off, with the range for
adoptive leave signifying primary and secondary caregiver status.52 The
ACLU, the ACLU of Ohio, and Outten & Golden, LLP based their
charge, in part, on sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).53 Men whose wives do not
return to work in that time and whose wives are medically healthy are
“disproportionately prevented from being primary caretakers,” they
claimed.54
On August 31, 2017, the EEOC filed a claim against Estee Lauder in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.55 Estee Lauder’s paid paternal leave
45. Id.
46. J.P. Morgan Chase EEOC Complaint, ACLU (updated June 15, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/cases/jp-morgan-chase-eeoc-complaint.
47. EEOC Charge – Derek Rotondo, ACLU (June 14, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/legaldocument/eeoc-charge-derek-rotondo, ¶ 1-2. (From supra note 46, click on “Legal Documents EEOC
Charge – Derek Rotondo” at the bottom of the webpage to get to the downloadable legal document.)
48. Id. at ¶ 3.
49. Id.
50. Id. at ¶ 9.
51. Id. at ¶ 11.
52. Forging Ahead of Falling Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report
by PL+US: Paid Leave for the United States, supra note 18.
53. J.P. Morgan Chase EEOC Complaint, supra note 46; EEOC Charge – Derek Rotondo, supra
note 47, at ¶ 3.
54. EEOC Charge – Derek Rotondo, supra note 47, at ¶ 20.
55. Compl. at 1, EEOC v. Estee Lauder Cos. Inc., filed, 2:17-cv-03897-JP (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30,
2017).
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benefits consist of maternity leave, adoption leave, primary caregiver
leave, and secondary caregiver leave.56 Six weeks of paid leave are
offered under the first three categories, and two weeks of paid leave are
offered under the secondary caregiver policy.57 Primary caregiver leave
is only made available for male Estee Lauder employees in surrogacy
situations.58 The EEOC alleges that under Title VII, the four parental
leave policies together “discriminate based on sex against aggrieved
individuals by affording such individuals lesser paid parental leave . . .
than are afforded eligible female employees who are biological
mothers.”59 The employee in the suit is a father who requested primary
caregiver leave and was told that he was only eligible for secondary
caregiver leave.60
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed any male caregiver
discrimination claim, the Supreme Court’s employment law
jurisprudence disfavors male caregivers to date.61 With the reemergence
of these two paternity leave discrimination suits, the Supreme Court may
have the opportunity to find in favor of male caregivers in the future.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 given the prominence of
discriminatory practices preceding the 1960s and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s assurance of equality for all.62 Through Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, Congress validated a “federal policy of prohibiting
wrongful discrimination in the Nation’s workplaces and in all sectors of
the economic endeavor.”63
The statute defines discrimination in two ways. Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”64 Additionally, it is unlawful, under Title VII, “to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 10.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 285 n. 202 (2013) (citing Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers
and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1317 (2005)).
62. Connie Kremer, The Role of McDonnell Douglas in a Post-Gross World: Is It Time to Retire
Burden-Shifting in Age Discrimination Claims?, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (2016).
63. Id. (citing Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2522 (2013)).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”65 For a successful claim, wrongful employment conduct
must be taken “because of” an individual’s protected trait.66
Courts label cases differently under Title VII based on different factual
scenarios.67 For example, individual disparate treatment cases are ones
in which an employer treated a particular employee or group of employees
differently due to a protected trait.68 Depending on the type of evidence
submitted in a case, individual disparate treatment cases are further
broken into three more categories: (1) single-motive cases based on direct
evidence, (2) single-motive cases based on circumstantial evidence,
which use the McDonnell Douglas framework, and (3) mixed-motive
cases.69 The language of Title VII does not establish an apparent
framework or standard by which these claims should be proven.70 Thus,
this Comment focuses on the distinction between the direct evidence and
McDonnell Douglas analyses and shows how a direct evidence analysis
is more appropriate for paternity leave discrimination lawsuits under Title
VII.
Title VII discrimination claims have undergone many alternative
analyses since Title VII’s inception in 1964.71 Soon after Title VII’s
origination, “sex-plus” was introduced as an analysis under Title VII that
enabled employers to escape liability for supposed sex discrimination.72
“Sex-plus” was the notion that a woman can be denied some benefit to
which men are entitled, not merely because of the woman’s sex, but also
because of some extraneous factor.73 In 1969, the court in Lansdale v.
United Air Lines, Inc. determined that it was legal for an airline to fire a
flight attendant if she was fired for being a woman and being married.74
The court reasoned that “being married” was an additional, “plus” factor
that meant that the woman was not being discriminated against because
of sex only.75 Thus, the court concluded that no Title VII violation had
65. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
66. MACK A. PLAYER AND SANDRA F. SPERINO, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 200 (West Academic Publishing, 8th ed. 2017).
67. Id. at 201.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 201, 217.
70. Kremer, supra note 62, at 1410.
71. Id. at 1407-08.
72. Kathleen M. Barry, A History of Flight Attendants, FEMININITY IN FLIGHT,
http://feminityinflight.com/activism.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
73. Id.
74. No. 68-1458-CIV-CA, 1969 WL 139, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 1969) (emphasis added).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
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occurred.76 In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the Supreme Court in
1971 dismissed such “sex-plus” arguments for employers’ sex-related
employment policies.77
The pregnancy discrimination movement in 1974 accrued a loss when
an employment disability package that excluded pregnancy was held by
the Supreme Court to not discriminate on the basis of sex within the
meaning of Title VII.78 Consequently, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(“PDA”) was passed in the late 1970s as an amendment to Title VII:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .79
This “because of” language is still used in sex discrimination cases
today.80
C. Direct Evidence Analyses in Title VII Discrimination Claims
When an employment policy facially treats protected classes
differently, courts recognize such express discrimination as “direct
evidence.”81 The term’s inception occurred after the Supreme Court’s
1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.82 Such employment
policies are direct evidence because “they explicitly link a protected trait
to a denial of employment opportunity.”83 A jury does not need to “draw
inferences to decide whether the fact asserted exists . . . the evidence
directly supports the existence or non-existence of the fact.”84 For
example, a policy that denies fertile women, instead of fertile men, jobs
entailing exposure to toxic chemicals is direct evidence of

76. Id.
77. Barry, supra note 72.
78. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-35 (1976) (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
79. Young, supra note 11, at 1213 n. 140 (citing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No.
95-555 § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k))).
80. PLAYER & SPERINO, supra note 66.
81. Id. at 202.
82. Robert A. Kearney, Comment, The High Price of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct
Evidence of Discrimination, 5 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 303, 304 n. 5 (2003).
83. PLAYER & SPERINO, supra note 66, at 202.
84. U.S. v. Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1031 (11th Cir. 1982).
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discrimination.85 In general, policies that explicitly limit employment
opportunities for workers based on race or sex are direct evidence of
discrimination under Title VII.86
In Price Waterhouse, a successful accountant sought partnership at her
firm but was denied because she was too “macho,” did not walk, talk, or
dress femininely, and did not wear make-up, style her hair, or wear
jewelry.87 The Supreme Court ruled that sex discrimination occurred
under Title VII, because the term “sex” in Title VII encompasses both sex
and gender, with gender being defined as “the socially-constructed roles,
behaviors, and attributes that society considers appropriate for men and
women.”88 An employer cannot discriminate because of gender
nonconformity “as well as more obvious forms of sex discrimination.”89
This legal framework, regarding sex and gender discrimination, should
arguably function for both men and women.90
In the 1970s, the Seventh Circuit determined that a no-marriage policy
for stewardesses of an employer airline discriminated on the basis of sex
and was not justified as a bona fide occupational qualification
(“BFOQ”).91 Claiming that a BFOQ existed is a defense for employers;
a BFOQ enables employers to take into account certain protected traits
when the employers make employment decisions.92 If the duties of a
stewardess were disrupted by her marital status, then the court would have
permitted the policy to stand.93 The court concluded that married
stewardesses could still provide the necessary comfort, safety, and
security of airplane passengers.94 A passenger’s personal preference for

85. PLAYER & SPERINO, supra note 66, at 202 (citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187 (1991)).
86. PLAYER & SPERINO, supra note 66, at 202.
87. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 262 n. 52-53 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 233-35 (1989)).
88. Eric S. Dreiband and Brett Swearingen, The Evolution of Title VII—Sexual Orientation,
Gender Identity, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, JONES DAY (Apr. 2015),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/07f7db13-4b8c-44c3-a89b6dcfe4a9e2a1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/74a116bc-2cfe-42d2-92a5787b40ee0567/dreiband_lgbt.authcheckdam.pdf, 6.
89. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 262 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 250 (1989)).
90. Id. at 264.
91. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971).
92. SUSAN GROVER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE
CASEBOOK 115 (2d ed. 2014); Title VII outlines that “[i]t should not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e)).
93. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1199.
94. Id.
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a flight attendant of a particular marital status was insufficient as a basis
for a BFOQ.95 The court held, therefore, that the no-marriage policy
invoked disparate treatment due to sex.96 Although the term “direct
evidence” was not explicitly used in this case and would not be used in
Title VII jurisprudence for over a decade more, the no-marriage policy
was an example of direct evidence of discriminatory treatment that
constituted a violation of Title VII.97
Although a woman was technically entitled to time off under both
maternity leave and medical leave policies at her place of employment,
the actual application of these policies by her employer was sufficient for
the Middle District of Georgia to conclude that the policies were direct
evidence of sex discrimination.98 In Maddox v. Grandview Care Center,
a nurse had a prior, complicated pregnancy that resulted in the death of
her child fifteen hours after its birth.99 Three months into her second
pregnancy, she began experiencing the same complications, and her
doctor advised her to avoid any strenuous activity.100 The nurse requested
a six-month leave of absence with her employer and was ultimately asked
to resign.101 The policies at issue were a maternity leave policy that was
“limited to three months per employee” and a leave of absence policy for
“illness” for an “indefinite duration.”102 The court determined that the
nurse was not granted a leave of absence for the duration of her
pregnancy, but male employees were allowed similar lengths of leave for
other medical reasons.103 Thus, the maternity leave policy was facially
discriminatory and constituted “direct evidence of unlawful
discrimination on account of pregnancy.”104
D. McDonnell Douglas Framework for Title VII Discrimination Claims
The McDonnell Douglas analysis, which applies a three-step model of
burden shifting, should only be used in cases involving circumstantial
evidence.105 Under the McDonnell Douglas test, (1) the plaintiff must
“establish a prima facie case of improperly motivated disparate treatment
if the evidence eliminates the most common legitimate reasons for
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Kearney, supra note 82.
Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1404, 1406 (M.D. Ga. 1985).
Id. at 1405.
Id.
Id. at 1405-06.
Id. at 1406 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
PLAYER & SPERINO, supra note 66, at 219.
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disparate treatment”; then (2) the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to “articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
disparate treatment of plaintiff”; and (3) should the defendant carry its
burden, the plaintiff must then “present evidence sufficient to show that
the defendant’s articulated reason was a ‘pretext’ for illegal
discrimination.”106
To establish the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis – the
plaintiff’s establishment of a prima facie case – the plaintiff must show
four things: (1) “plaintiff belongs to a protected class”; (2) “plaintiff was
qualified for the position”; (3) “though qualified, plaintiff suffered some
adverse employment action”; and (4) “the employer treated similarly
situated people outside of plaintiff’s protected class differently.”107
The Third Circuit in Schafer v. Board of Public Education used the
McDonnell Douglas analysis to classify a leave policy as discriminatory,
because the policy provided yearlong, unpaid leave to women but not
men.108 A male teacher was denied a year of unpaid leave to take care of
his newborn son.109 The court recognized that direct evidence or an
analysis through the McDonnell Douglas framework could establish a
prima facie case for employment discrimination.110 The court concluded
that the employee did set out a prima facie case for employment
discrimination because the relevant section of the collective bargaining
agreement was discriminatory on its face.111 The section specified that
“pregnant woman” had two options: (1) they were allowed sick leave,
combined with a period of unpaid leave for childbearing or childrearing,
for a maximum of one year, or (2) maternity leave not exceeding one
year.112 There was no requirement under the collective bargaining
agreement that the woman be disabled in order to obtain the unpaid leave
for up to one year (for either childbearing or childrearing).113
After determining that the teacher established a prima facie case for
employment discrimination, the court then looked at the supposedly
nondiscriminatory reasons the defendant provided for its challenged

106. Id. at 220.
107. Kremer, supra note 62, at 1411 n. 27 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 903 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990); prima facie case requires a showing “(i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualification, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications”).
108. 903 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990).
109. Id. at 244-45.
110. Id. at 247.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphases added).
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policy.114 The employer relied on the PDA, claiming that Supreme Court
precedent enabled it to give favorable treatment toward pregnant
women.115 The court found that the precedent was distinguishable from
the facts in Schafer, because disability was not relied on in the Schafer
policies, thereby concluding that the defendant failed to meet the burden
shifted to it.116 Thus, because the employee met his prima facie case, and
the employer did not meet its burden, the Third Circuit ruled in the
employee’s favor.117
III. DISCUSSION
Many more paternity leave policies are discriminatory on their faces
than employers and employees realize.118 Because of this, a direct
evidence analysis will be superior to the McDonnell Douglas analysis by
courts addressing subsequent paternity leave lawsuits. Part (a) addresses
this notion and looks at situations when courts have improperly and
unnecessarily applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis in the past. Part
(b) addresses examples of current paternity leave policies that may
present direct evidence of sex discrimination and explanations for why
these policies are discriminatory. Part (c) analyzes current congressional
bill proposals and the implications the passing of those bills can have on
subsequent paternity leave discussions. Optimal parental leave policy
language is also established.
A. Direct Evidence Analysis v. McDonnell Douglas Analysis
A direct evidence analysis is superior to a McDonnell Douglas analysis
when parental leave policies undergo scrutiny by the courts. Maternity
and paternity leave policies have language that either does or does not
show discrimination on its face. In reading the language of policies, jurors
do or do not have to draw inferences. If they do not have to draw
inferences, yet the policy still clearly applies different treatment for
women than it does for men, then the policy is direct evidence of sex
discrimination under Title VII. Moreover, even if policies seem to apply
the same treatment for men and women upon first reading, if the
application of those policies in the workforce is discriminatory in the
workplace, the policies are still direct evidence of sex discrimination

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 247.
Id. (relying on Guerra, 479 U.S. at 272).
Id. at 248.
Id.
Young, supra note 11, at 1225.
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under Maddox.119
Courts often over apply the McDonnell Douglas framework, without
even considering actual direct evidence, because it is the common
analysis referred to in almost any Title VII discrimination case.120
However, there are numerous instances of direct evidence being presented
in discrimination cases, meaning there is no need for the strenuous burden
shifting that McDonnell Douglas requires.121
One such example of incorrect McDonnell Douglas application
occurred in Schafer.122 The maternity leave policy at issue in Schafer was
facially discriminatory. The leave policy provided yearlong leave for
women, but not men, and the reasoning for the difference was not related
to medical recovery or a disability in giving birth.123 Moreover, the court
itself did already determine that the collective bargaining agreement that
laid out this policy was discriminatory on its face.124 Because
circumstantial evidence was not involved and the policy was clearly
facially discriminatory, the subsequent burden shifting analysis of
McDonnell Douglas was unnecessary. Instead, the court should have
applied the direct evidence analysis and allowed the employer to simply
argue any defenses that it may have had after direct evidence was shown.
The court overcomplicated the analysis by utilizing McDonnell Douglas.
Chase employees, like the employee who brought a claim alongside the
ACLU in June of 2017, have a strong showing of direct evidence, based
on the nuance of the adoptive parent leave policy especially. By offering
up to sixteen weeks off for adoptive parents (if they fit the primary
caregiver status), Chase is blatantly discriminating against men with
biological newborns, because men’s leave is only two weeks and not
based on primary caregiver status. By allowing adoptive parents sixteen
weeks off if they are the primary caregivers, but only allowing biological
paternity leave of two weeks, regardless of the man’s claim of primary or
secondary caregiver status, Chase is assuming that biological men are not
possibly primary caregivers. Therefore, it is archaic for a court analyzing
this claim in subsequent proceedings to use McDonnell Douglas in its
discussion.
The court in EEOC v. Estee Lauder, filed in August 2017, may likewise
feel tempted to look at the four leave policies at issue under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. The court might use this analysis
119. See GROVER ET AL., supra note 98 (emphasis added).
120. See generally Kremer, supra note 62; see also Connie Kremer, McDonnell Douglas Burden
Shifting and Judicial Economy in Title VII Retaliation Claims: In Pursuit of Expediency, Resulting in
Inefficiency, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 857 (2017).
121. See, e.g., Schafer, 903 F.2d at 248.
122. 903 F.2d at 247-48.
123. Id. at 248.
124. Id. at 247.
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thinking the policy does not show direct evidence of sex discrimination
because the four policies offered by Estee Lauder do not explicitly
reference men versus women.125 However, this analysis would be
incorrect under Maddox, because the application of the policies by Estee
Lauder is that men are only permitted to take leave under secondary
caregiver status.126 Such disparate treatment of men, for the sole reason
that men assumedly cannot be primary caregivers, is direct evidence of
sex discrimination by Estee Lauder.
The defendant-employers in the June 2017 J.P. Morgan Chase lawsuit
and the August 2017 Estee Lauder lawsuit may be tempted to argue that
the reason for the differences in treatment between men and women
regarding paternal leave policies is something “in addition to” sex,
implying a “sex-plus” argument, like the employer in Lansdale. J.P.
Morgan Chase and Estee Lauder may argue that sex, plus medical
recovery time, is the reason for the distinction. However, under Phillips,
“sex-plus” arguments were deemed inadequate,127 so a court should be
keen to reject such common arguments made by employers in pregnancy
discrimination suits.
Moreover, McDonnell Douglas is overused, and direct evidence
analyses should take precedence in future paternity leave discrimination
suits because direct evidence analyses do allow for the inclusion of some
circumstantial evidence at times, without going through the tedious
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting.128 Such circumstantial evidence
used to show a facially discriminatory policy without the McDonnell
Douglas framework could include emails exchanged between employees
and the upper management. While policies themselves may not show
direct evidence of discrimination, the circumstantial inferences obtained
through such emails could still be evidence enough overall of facial
discrimination.
The time is ripe for a general alteration in the field of paternity leave
discrimination analyses. Many policies provide such direct evidence on
their face that McDonnell Douglas should be rejected for these claims
arising present-day.129

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

supra note 55 at 5.
Id. at 8.
Barry, supra note 72.
GROVER ET AL., supra note 92, at 73.
See Young, supra note 11, at 1224-27.
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B. Many paternity leave policies currently show direct evidence of sex
discrimination.
The Supreme Court in California Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Guerra determined that the PDA allows employment
practices favoring pregnant women.130 California’s Fair Employment and
Housing Act required employers to offer up to four months of unpaid
pregnancy disability leave.131 The issue in this case was whether Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended by the PDA of 1978,
preempted this California statute.132 The Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that “Title VII does not preempt a state law that
guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability
leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with, nor unlawful under,
Title VII.”133 Justice Marshall emphasized that the California statute does
not violate Title VII because the statute is “narrowly drawn to cover only
the period of actual physical disability on account of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”134 Because the difference
between leave for men and women was based strictly on actual physical
disability resulting from childbirth, the statute was distinguishable from
previously invalidated statutes that excluded or protected members of a
class because they were supposedly inherently handicapped or innately
inferior.135
In response to Guerra, the EEOC guidance on caregiver discrimination
warns employers:
Significantly, while employers are permitted by Title VII to provide
women with leave specifically for the period that they are
incapacitated because of pregnancy . . . employers may not treat
either sex more favorably with respect to other kinds of leave, such
as leave for childcare purposes. To avoid a potential Title VII
violation, employers should carefully distinguish between
pregnancy-related leave and other forms of leave, ensuring that any
leave specifically provided to women alone is limited to the period
that women are incapacitated by pregnancy and childbirth.136
130. 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987).
131. Id. at 276 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 12945(b)(2)).
132. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 274-75.
133. Id. at 280 (citing Cal. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
134. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 290 (emphasis in original).
135. Id. at n. 28 (emphasis added) (citing Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 725, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982)).
136. Young, supra note 11, at 1220 n. 188 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n
Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers With Caregiving Responsibilities 2425 (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf).
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Dicta in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs further
supports this proposition that disability in pregnancy leave between men
and women can only be dependent on medical disability recovery time.137
Chief Justice Rehnquist termed extended disability leave as an “invalid
stereotype” when it went “far [in excess] of the medically recommended
pregnancy disability leave period of six weeks.”138 The PDA legislative
history establishes eight weeks as the typical maximum medical recovery
period for normal childbirth.139
With these premises in mind, there is likely little reason an employer
can give for discrepancies between leave for men and women when the
women are receiving more than six to eight weeks of leave. However, a
vast majority of policies for America’s top companies offer more than
eight weeks of leave for women, without simultaneously allowing such
additional allotted time to men.140 For example, Proctor and Gamble
currently offers sixteen weeks of paid leave for mothers and, at most, four
weeks of paid leave for fathers.141 Proctor and Gamble’s 2016 Citizenship
Report specifies:
Our comprehensive benefits and policies for maternity, paternity
and adoption give parents the time and space they need to be the best
parents they can be. In the U.S., parental leave includes 16 weeks
for birth mothers and adoptive parents, and four weeks for all other
new parents. Through paid and unpaid leave, parents can take off up
to their child’s entire first year.142
Similarly, McDonald’s offers twelve weeks of paid maternity leave and
zero days of paid paternity leave for all salaried and hourly employees.143
Proctor and Gamble clearly has a favorable policy toward fathers,
137. Young, supra note 11, at 1219 (citing Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 72223 (2003)).
138. Id. (citing Hibbs, 528 U.S. at 733 n. 6).
139. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 at n. 4 (2003) (citing H.R.Rep. No.
101-28, pt. 1, p. 30 (1989)); see also Hibbs, 528 U.S. at 730-31 n. 3-4 (The Parental and Medical Leave
Act of 1986: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations and the
Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.,
16 (1986) (finding that “six weeks is the medically recommended pregnancy disability leave period”)).
140. Forging Ahead of Falling Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report
by PL+US: Paid Leave for the United States, supra note 18.
141. Id.
142. P&G
2016
Citizenship
Report,
PROCTOR
AND
GAMBLE
(2016),
file:///C:/Users/CEEMS/Downloads/PG2016CitizenshipReport.pdf.
143. Forging Ahead of Falling Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report
by PL+US: Paid Leave for the United States, supra note 18 (maternity leave pay is at 50% during these
twelve weeks).
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above what many other companies offer to fathers.144 That the company
grants paid leave to men at all is above the norm.145 Despite this
commendable approach, Proctor and Gamble’s paid offerings between
men and women are still different enough that the policy could likely be
deemed discriminatory toward men. McDonald’s policy is even more
overtly discriminatory on its face and shows direct evidence of sex
discrimination. Because the legislative histories cited in Guerra and
Hibbs show the common principle that six to eight weeks of medical
recovery time for women is sufficient postpartum, any additional weeks
off above six to eight weeks for female employees must be offered to men
too to avoid sex discrimination. This is because the “medical reason” of
providing different treatment for female employees is no longer in effect
after six to eight weeks.
By offering sixteen weeks of paid leave for women and four weeks of
paid leave for men, Proctor and Gamble offers four to six extra, nonmedical recovery, paid weeks off to a mother after the birth of her child
compared to what it offers men. This is because women get twelve more
weeks off than men, which is four to six weeks more than the medically
recommended time period provided in Guerra and Hibbs. Similarly,
when McDonald’s offers women twelve weeks of time off and men zero
weeks, it is offering four to six extra, non-medically required weeks off
to mothers, and not fathers, after the births of their children.
Thus, based on Guerra, Hibbs, and the EEOC guidance on caregiver
discrimination, it is evident that employees at Proctor and Gamble,
McDonald’s, and other similarly situated companies may have Title VII
claims based on their applicable maternity and paternity leave policies.
These policies provide direct evidence of sex discrimination under Title
VII.
C. Arguments for Suggested Changes in Paternity Leave Policies in the
Future and Solutions for Avoiding Title VII Claims Altogether
Several current federal bill proposals give hope for gender-neutral
treatment with leave policies in the future. Federal employees are already
permitted to take twelve weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month
period “because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in
order to care for such son and daughter” or “because of the placement of
a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care.”146 The
proposed Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2017 in both the
144. Forging Ahead of Falling Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report
by PL+US: Paid Leave for the United States, supra note 18.
145. Id.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 6382(a)(1)(A)-(B).
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House of Representatives and the Senate seeks to amend the current state
of affairs for federal employees by granting six of those twelve weeks as
paid parental leave in connection with the birth or placement of a child.147
The Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act, while already genderneutral on its face, can have immense benefits for working fathers seeking
to spend time bonding with their newborns. When women are the primary
breadwinners of a household, they often return to work just two weeks
after giving birth because of money concerns.148 Because men are still
usually the primary breadwinners today149, though, the granting of
payment with federal employee leave will enable a majority of them to
now take time off with their wives, since they will be making money
during the first six weeks at least.
The proposed Parental Bereavement Act of 2017, also known as the
Sarah-Grace-Farley-Kluger Act, seeks to amend the FMLA by allowing
up to twelve weeks of leave during a twelve-year period “[b]ecause of the
death of a son or daughter.”150 The FMLA currently allows for five
situations in which a parent can take twelve weeks of leave:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter and in order to care for
such son or daughter; (B) Because of the placement of a son or
daughter with the employee because for adoption or foster care; (C)
In order to care for a spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious
medical condition; (D) Because of a serious health condition that
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the
employee’s position; (E) Because of any qualifying exigency. . .
arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent
of the employee is on covered active duty. . . in the Armed Forces.151
Therefore, this sixth reason for FMLA leave, if passed, will be the first
reason relating to an employee’s mental illness that does not require
147. Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2017, H.R. 1022, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017);
Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2017, S. 362, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
148. Danielle Paquette and Damian Paletta, U.S. Could Get First Paid Family Leave Benefit Under
WASHINGTON
POST
(May
18,
2017),
Trump
Budget
Proposal,
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/05/18/u-s-could-get-first-paid-family-leavebenefit-under-trump-plan/?utm_term=.917680bdf067.
149. Paid Family and Medical Leave: An Issue Whose Time Has Come, AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING
GROUP ON PAID FAMILY LEAVE (May 2017), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/PaidFamily-and-Medical-Leave-An-Issue-Whose-Time-Has-Come.pdf (citing Wendy Wang et al.,
Breadwinner
Moms,
Pew
Research
Center
(May
29,
2013),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/29/breadwinner-moms/).
150. Parental Bereavement Act of 2017, H.R. 1560, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017); Parental
Bereavement Act of 2017, S. 528, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(E).
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inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health care professional.152
Currently, provision (D) of 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), the FMLA, allows an
employee to leave for a serious health condition, but a serious health
condition, as defined by the statute, requires a mental condition that
involves “inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical
facility” or “continuing treatment by a health care provider.”153
The policy implications of the Sarah-Grace-Farley-Kluger Act have the
potential to pave the way for more flexible and forgiving paternity leave
laws in the future because of the difference between this sixth proposed
provision and the previous five. Presumably, the reason for this bill
proposal is that the mental and emotional implications of losing a child
are severe enough for the average employee that twelve weeks of
permitted leave is fair and healthy for them. If this bill were to become
law, a similar argument can be made for parental leave laws for mothers
and fathers alike; the mental and emotional implications of having a
newborn are arguably also valid reasons necessitating federal leave laws
for parents of newborns, outside of mere medical recovery time.154
Moreover, because this provision, as proposed, does not require
bereavement leave due to a serious medical condition, employees will not
need to show proof of inpatient care or continuing health care treatment.
Similarly then, the mental and emotional implications of having a child,
as opposed to losing one, can be valid reasons for necessitating a law
permitting parental leave for more than physical recovery time. New
parents would not need to show that they are hospitalized for the mental
strain of having a newborn or are getting mental health care treatment
because of having a newborn. They can use the proposed sixth prong of
FMLA, which, as proposed, does not require a serious health condition of
the employee, as support for this argument. Therefore, the passing of the
Sarah-Grace-Farley-Kluger Act and the reasoning of Congress for
effectuating its passing may bode well for proponents of a federal parental
leave policy in their arguments for laws requiring leave above what is
permitted for mere medical recovery.155
President Donald Trump’s budget proposal in the spring of 2017
included a proposal for paid parental leave for both mothers and
fathers.156 The program, which predictably will cost up to $25 billion in
the first decade, potentially will be paid for by the federal unemployment

152. Id.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(A)-(B).
154. See discussion supra Part III.b.
155. Id.
156. Jeanne Sahadi, Trump’s First Budget: Trillions in Cuts, CNN (May 23, 2017, 3:26 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/22/news/economy/trump-budget/index.html?iid=EL.
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insurance system.157 The plan will grant six weeks of paid leave to all
employees of newborns or adopted children.158 However, the recent 429page House of Representatives budget bill to provide for reconciliation
on the budget for 2018 does not reference paid parental leave at all.159
The implications of this program are more significant than the
implications of any of the bills proposed by Congress, because the
program will enable fathers to forgo the stigmatism they feel in taking
parental leave and needing to be the breadwinners of the family.160 By
permitting paid leave for fathers equal to mothers, paternity leave policies
may slowly change to equalize leave for mothers and fathers, instead of
basing the leave solely on medical necessity.
However, this program will not solve all discrimination problems with
paternity leave policies, because many employers will still provide more
than six weeks of leave for mothers.161 To avoid direct evidence of
discrimination with policies that are longer than six weeks for mothers,
employers will need to provide the additional time given to mothers,
above medical necessity, to fathers as well. Furthermore, some employers
may want to maintain their distinctions between primary and secondary
caregivers in their paternal leave policies, like Chase,162 which would not
be illegal to do under Trump’s budget proposal.
While some companies, like Bank of America, offer very generous
leave for mothers and fathers for equal amounts of time,163 these policies
may not be the most optimal approach to paternity leave policies in the
future. For example, Bank of America nobly offers sixteen weeks of paid
leave for biological fathers, biological mothers, and adoptive parents
alike,164 but to avoid a Title VII claim by women, it may be more
appropriate for birth mothers to receive the medically recognized six
weeks more recovery time than men. For instance, it may be more
appropriate for Bank of America and similarly situated companies to offer
sixteen paid weeks to women and ten weeks of paid leave to men and
adoptive parents or twenty-two paid weeks of leave to women and sixteen
weeks of paid leave for men and adoptive parents. Women could
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017).
160. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 279-81.
161. Forging Ahead of Falling Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report
by PL+US: Paid Leave for the United States, supra note 18.
162. See EEOC Charge – Derek Rotondo, supra note 47, at ¶ 1-2; see Forging Ahead of Falling
Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report by PL+US: Paid Leave for the United
States, supra note 18.
163. Forging Ahead of Falling Behind? Paid Family Leave at America’s Top Companies, A Report
by PL+US: Paid Leave for the United States, supra note 18.
164. Id.
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arguably bring Title VII discrimination claims against these companies
that offer the same number of weeks to women as they offer to men and
adoptive parents. The men and adoptive parents receive more time off
for “bonding” than the mothers do, since some of the mothers’ time off is
for medical recovery (six of the sixteen weeks), and this is discriminatory
toward birthing mothers. Therefore, going forward, the best solution for
avoiding Title VII discrimination claims, in light of the medical recovery
time period outlined in Guerra, Hibbs, and the EEOC guidance on
caregiver discrimination, would be to offer men exactly six weeks of paid
leave less than birth mothers are offered.
IV. CONCLUSION
Numerous discrimination cases improperly utilize the McDonnell
Douglas analysis when there is already direct evidence of sex
discrimination shown without such burden-shifting. Many policies, in the
very manner they are written, show direct evidence of sex discrimination
because they offer men and women leave time that is greater than the six
week disparity that is allowed under Supreme Court case law and EEOC
guidelines. Some policies are implemented under the assumption that
men cannot garner primary caregiver status, thus also showing direct
evidence of sex discrimination. To avoid any sex discrimination suits
under Title VII in the future, companies should look to write policies with
exactly six weeks differential between men and birthing mothers’ leave.
Policies that offer women more than six weeks leave over men’s leave or
less than six weeks leave over men’s leave may all be discriminatory on
their faces. Because of the aforementioned reasons, a direct evidence
analysis is superior to the McDonnell Douglas analysis in most
subsequent paternity leave sex discrimination lawsuits.
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